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I
INTRODUCTION

In her ambitious critique of securities disclosure law, Professor Kim
Scheppele seeks to attack a utilitarian account of, and prescription for, that law.1
She seeks, as well-and this is what makes her contribution ambitious-to offer
an alternative way to create, and a different standard to criticize, legal rules than
the method offered by the utilitarian paradigm. Her account of, and prescription
for, securities disclosure law derives from a contractualist approach to rule
formulation and criticism. Her approach is inspired by, but somewhat different
from, that employed by John Rawls in his famous work, A Theory of Justice.2
On a practical level, Professor Scheppele offers criticism of the current
Supreme Court law on insider trading reflected in Chiarellav. United States' and
Dirks v. Securities Exchange Commission.4 Her policy recommendation is that
federal disclosure law should recognize a duty to disclose nonpublic information
or abstain from trading in securities whenever a market participant has access to
information that is not accessible to all other participants in the market. She
sees her proposal as differing from current law in that under her rule it would
not matter whether one with nonpublic information received it as part of a
relationship that implied confidence or knew that his or her receipt of the
nonpublic information was made possible by a breach of trust.
I begin by recognizing that this article is a pleasure to read. It is lucid,
knowledgeable, textured, and innovative. The paper represents an imaginative
effort to combine the method of Rawls (and others) with some available
empirical data on risk preferences, and to apply that learning to problems of
disclosure law. It thus enjoys an uncommon scope and breadth. Ultimately,
however, for the reason discussed below, I find Professor Scheppele's critique of
the existing Supreme Court law governing securities disclosure unconvincing.
Perhaps more basically, I remain skeptical that the method employed by the
article offers what its author hopes it can: a technique to generate specific legal
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norms that is explicitly concerned with distributional consequences of rules while
avoiding messy, inherently contestable valuations of their "fairness."
My comments address only the more general aspects of Professor Scheppele's
paper. They fall under two general headings. First, I offer a single basic
criticism of the article's substantive critique of existing disclosure law. That
criticism is premised on my contention, which Professor Scheppele may not
sufficiently recognize, that transacting on markets, rather than face to face, has
important moral implications. Second, I discuss briefly the utility of the
"contractualist thought-experiment" method that Professor Scheppele employs.
This method strikes me as a seductive but ultimately delusional way to try to
convert moral questions into empirical questions. It has, however, an important
value: It forcefully asserts to those who construct and those who criticize legal
rules that the welfare of the least powerful should be of especial concern to the
law; that ultimately our legal order is a constituent part of our moral universe;
and that our system of legal rules must ultimately conform with the dominant
moral sentiments of the age if the law is to achieve a productive balance between
dynamic change and social stability.
II
SUBSTANCE AND METHOD

Professor Scheppele begins by questioning the principles offered to explain
the law that requires a corporate insider to disclose material, nonpublic
information or refrain from trading in the company's stock.5 She rejects a law
and economics explanation, which holds that since such information is not
acquired through private investment, it does not warrant property status and
should therefore be disclosed to foster efficiency in stock prices. In the
alternative, she offers fairness as a justification for the existing rule and for an
extension of it. But "fairness," the writer recognizes, is a conclusion that can be
vague and fuzzy, and has been criticized on that basis.6 Implicitly conceding the
strength of this criticism, the article attempts to give specific content to the term
"fairness," to free it from the charge that it is merely a "fuzzy" conclusion. To
do this, the author employs a contractualist technique that asks what rule
regarding disclosure would be freely accepted by persons acting ex ante, who
possessed no knowledge of whether they were likely to be possessors of material,
nonpublic information or transactors without such knowledge. She asserts that
if we were somehow to find ourselves in this quasi-original position,7 we-the
actual people located in this culture now-would adopt a rule that requires

5. Scheppele, supra note 1, at 126.
6. Scheppele, supra note 1, at 125.
7. I call this a quasi-original position because the hypothetical persons involved are behind only
a limited veil of ignorance. While they do not know what property they own, what information they
have, or what prospects they enjoy, they are, in other respects, our actual selves possessing the attitudes,
beliefs, biases, etc., of all people in the United States now.
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disclosure of all "deep" secrets (those that the other party has no means of
knowing). She calls this an equal access rule.8
As I understand the perspective of the law and economics scholars whom
Professor Scheppele opposes, it would assert that rational persons in this quasioriginal position would adopt a rule that would tend to increase efficiency or
maximize wealth, because the creation of more wealth will increase the
likelihood that both sides of any transaction can benefit from transacting.
Professor Scheppele asserts, commonsensically, that people are concerned with
distributional effects when their own interests are involved. Everybody wants a
share of the gains made in transactions to which they are a party. She posits
that, ex ante, such creatures would only consent to a legal regime that affords
everyone a chance for such participation. She asserts that the equal access rule
is the only disclosure rule that such persons, existing behind her partial veil of
ignorance, would accept freely. In so concluding, she assumes or believes that
residents of the United States are, to this extent, risk-averse; that psychologically,
they will identify with outsiders in insider trading transactions. That is, she
implicitly supposes that they would not see in information asymmetry a chance
to exploit others (or the situation) for a profit, but, rather, a risk to their own
ability to recover any part of the value of the information. Perhaps she is correct
about this. But if so, it would seem to be a consequence of particular psychological characteristics, not "rationality." In all events, she cites no data showing that
such psychological characteristics are shared by even a majority of U.S. residents,
thus falling short of the improbable burden of this method: to produce only
rules to which all would agree.
A. The Moral Significance of Trading on Markets
Professor Scheppele's criticism of the existing Supreme Court law of
disclosure is rooted in a series of cases stretching back into the nineteenth
century. These cases are meant to show that the Supreme Court misread history
when, in Chiarella, it indicated that an affirmative duty to disclose information
has not been generally recognized by the common law.9 The criticism is, I
suggest, fundamentally flawed. While the cases cited, and others,1" established
that courts have, in some settings, imposed liability for failure to make a
disclosure, they are inapposite, when the purchase and sale transaction is one
that occurs on a large public market. Trading on such a market has legal and
(perhaps more importantly for the article's legal reform purpose) moral
implications that Professor Scheppele does not sufficiently recognize.
The seller or buyer of stock on one of the regulated markets has no
relationship at all with the particular entity on the other side of that transaction.
The transaction is completed through impersonal agencies matching anonymous

8.
9.
10.

Scheppele, supra note 1, at 125.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227.
See, e.g., Cummings v. Dusenbery, 338 N.E.2d 575 (IlI. App. Ct. 1984).
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buy and sell orders. Only price and number of shares matter to those involved.
Unlike the face-to-face negotiation, the seller cannot induce the buyer to act or
facilitate the sale. The buyer cannot rely, to any extent, upon the seller's
conduct. They do not know each other. This complete absence of a social
relationship between buyer and seller has pertinence, it seems to me, if one
wants to define what moral obligations, if any, persons in this culture bear
towards each other.
It may be answered that the lack of any meaningful relationship between
anonymous market participants cannot conclusively establish that anonymous
market actors have no special moral relationships (upon which one can build a
legal duty). I may have no prior relationship with pedestrians as I drive my car
down a busy road, but I plainly do owe moral and legal duties to them. They
are persons who might foreseeably be injured should I fail to exercise ordinary
care. This duty to strangers is morally quite intuitive; the power to harm gives
rise to the duty to take care. Can some principle like that which accounts for a
driver's duty to strangers justify a buyer or seller's duty to disclose relevant
"deeply secret" information to a public market? I would not think so, because
(and here I am on a very different wavelength than Professor Scheppele) I do
not accept that those who trade on an impersonal market are themselves injured
by another market participant's failure to disclose inside information or to refrain
from trading.
This is because one buying or selling on a large active market would buy or
sell at the market price whether or not the insider traded. From this supposition,
one could conclude, as I do, that the "insider" is causing no financial harm to
those on the opposite side of the transaction, whomever they may be. In theory,
the contrary is the case. If the "insider" is buying, she will tend to push the price
up, to the marginal benefit of contemporaneous sellers, and if she is selling, she
will theoretically tend to push down the price.
Thus, while I share the intuition that there can be something wrong with
"insider" trading on a public securities market, I remain unconvinced that it is
morally wrong because it causes special financial injury to those on the opposite
side of such transaction. It does not. Rather, when one thinks about the stock
price consequences of insider trading, one might conclude that those disadvantaged by such trading are persons who are on the same side of parallel
transactions at the same time. The insider trades, if large enough, will tend
detrimentally to affect the price at which their transactions are completed. But
while those on the same side of buy-sell transactions may theoretically be
affected by insider trades, they will be affected similarly by any buy or sell
transaction of the same dimensions. Impact upon them is not itself enough to
support a conclusion that they have been wrongfully affected. To justify that
conclusion, we must locate a norm-such as the due care norm in the auto
accident example-that will mark that conduct as wrong.
What norm do we assume if we intuit that insider trading is morally wrong?
I suppose that there are, arguably, two such norms, one that applies to issuers
and one that applies to individuals in possession of "inside" information. Both
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are premised upon the existence of a relationship that we see as deserving of
protection. Insofar as individuals are concerned, I suppose that the core of the
insider trading offense is the misappropriation of proprietary information
belonging to another. Thus, in using information for his personal benefit that
was supplied to him for a special, limited purpose, the printer in Chiarella"
might be seen as misappropriating property of another; of breaching a duty of
loyalty to his employer and derivatively to his employer's customer. While the
issuing corporation may itself experience no direct financial injury as a result of
such misuse of its nonpublic information, equity will act to police the relationship
in which the issuer entrusted its nonpublic information to another.12
A legal rule designed to enforce the limitations on use or disclosure of
nonpublic information implicit in its dissemination would not extend to the
issuer's own use of its material nonpublic information to purchase its stock on
a public market.13 Thus, if we wish to explain or justify a disclosure-or-abstain
rule for issuers buying their own stock, we must identify a different norm. I
suggest that the norm that shapes our intuition about that subject is the norm
that defines the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders. That
relationship-and the loyalty that we have long held that it implies 14 -would
provide an arguable moral basis, within the liberal model of society as made up
of autonomous individuals, to impose an obligation on an issuer to refrain from
voluntarily buying its own stock unless full disclosure of material information had
been made.15
Thus, because Professor Scheppele's analysis does not sufficiently consider
the moral or economic implications of trading on a public market, it is, to that
extent, not completely persuasive. In discussing the duties of the buyer of stock
on a public market, the Supreme Court ignored cases dealing with implied
covenants or fraud in face-to-face sales transactions. In so doing, it correctly
acknowledged, implicitly, the significance of trading on markets.

11. Chiarella,445 U.S. 222.
12. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
13. The issuer's sale of stock, even when through a public underwriting, is much more like a face-toface transaction than an anonymous market transaction. The buyer of stock from an issuer, whether on
a market or privately, like the buyer of goods in a face-to-face transaction, inevitably must rely upon the
statements of the seller-its financial reports especially-in making the investment decision. Thus, if we
search for the moral principle underlying disclosure rules that apply to issuers selling their own securities,
we need go no further than the norm of truth telling and candor in face-to-face dealings.
14. That duty of loyalty is itself narrow. The corporation does not, for example, owe its
stockholders any special responsibility with respect to transactions with shareholders on the corporations'
various product markets.
15. I express no opinion on the question whether the common law of directors' duties does require
the board to restrain the corporation from all dealings in its own stock on an impersonal public market
unless all material information has been disclosed. I mean simply to identify the relational norm upon
which such a result might be constructed.
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B. The Contractualist Method
The broader aim of Professor Scheppele's article is to demonstrate the utility,
in the formulation of specific legal rules, of a technique that she offers as an
alternative to that which she sees as the narrow and limited approach of legal
scholars in the thrall of neoclassical economics. She wants to call our attention
to an alternative to the utilitarian approach. In its most basic aspect, utilitarianism is concerned, she says, with the maximization of something-wealth often,
sometimes happiness or utility-but not with its distribution. Those legal
scholars bitten by this old bug are unconcerned about issues of the distributional
effects of rules, and thus about issues of fairness. 6 Indeed, she alludes to the
materialist statements of some who, confusing ambiguity with incoherence, seem
to deny the meaningfulness of such terms as fairness (and, one would suppose,
justice).
I think she sees this narrow vision of law as stultifying and inhumane, as
morally obtuse. She means to show us a way out without leading us into a
swamp of ambiguity. She offers a technique to generate specific legal rules that
aims frankly at distributional fairness, but that does so in a way that, if not
exactly empirical and positive, is perhaps close. She employs the technique of
constructing a "thought-experiment."' 7 This oxymoron reflects the unstable
ground between empiricism and metaphysics that Professor Scheppele's
methodology occupies. For the reasons discussed below, I am unpersuaded that
her method can succeed in "objectifying" fairness by removing from that label
the contestable element of moral judgment. For me, that is not a fatal criticism,
as I have never supposed that ambiguity and contestability could be completely
removed from legal discourse. But I do suppose that if the contractualist
technique fails to offer an escape from "fuzziness," Professor Scheppele will have
failed in one of her goals.
Professor Scheppele begins her method discussion by suggesting that the best
legitimating characteristic of a legal rule is the fact that it has been agreed upon
by all who will be bound by it. This, of course, could be contested, but in the
modern Western world of liberal individualism, it does seem a proposition to
which many would assent. Since it would appear that, for reasons of technology
if for no other, we cannot practically create legal rules by a process of actual
consent,18 Professor Scheppele suggests, as the foundation of legal rules, that

16. But see Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: CarryingCoase Further,100 YALE L.J.
1211 (1991).
17. Scheppele, supra note 1, at 153.
18. The method employed posits that the best rule is the rule to which all U.S. residents would
consent ex ante. If one is moderately practical, she might suppose that there is considerable chance that
there are very few rules (and none concerning civil liability for disclosure in connection with transactions
on public securities markets) to which literally all actual persons now in the United States could be
expected to agree if we could slip them behind a veil of ignorance. Presumably, a weaker version of the
method would accept consent by majority rule, but that version would give up an important concern of
Professor Scheppele-with the consent of the least advantaged-and is not the version that Professor
Scheppele pursues.
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rule-making elites imagine-aided by the best available empirical data-rules
that could find complete acceptance.
One might note the common ground that this model shares with the
utilitarian approach. In fact, I suppose that economist-inspired legal scholars
would not argue too much with Professor Scheppele concerning the priority of
consent as a legitimating force in law. Neoclassical economics is rooted in the
same liberal suppositions as is her own vision. Indeed, the standard Pareto
efficiency definition assumes, generally, that free consent to voluntary transactions is the road to human betterment. Professor Scheppele's liberalism departs
from the liberalism of the Chicago School version of the law and economics
movement, however, in two important respects. First, she is concerned with
choice in the formation of background legal rules, whereas the liberal economist
is concerned with individual choice in the structure and effectuation of
transactions. Second, and importantly, she is concerned with the distributional
consequences of legal rules (thus her insistence that all agree), whereas the
neoclassical economist, for the most part, stipulates the irrelevance of distributional consequences.
The notion that society can helpfully be viewed as the result of a hypothetical
social contract is, of course, old and productive. As employed by Professor
Rawls, for example, this perspective engenders fruitful and challenging
speculation. In his effort, Rawls assumes away every aspect of personhood
except rationality19 and implicitly makes some debatable assumptions about risk
aversion. From these assumptions a very active mind can (and did) construct a
fascinating vision. Professor Scheppele is a sociologist, not a philosopher.
Professionally bound in some way to empiricism, she employs the contractualist
method in a modified way. While she posits actual persons making decisions
about legal rules, and not, like Rawls, the moral essence of persons. Still, like
Rawls, a large part of her conclusion follows from her suppositions about how
such persons would choose. She supports her intuitions about equal access to
material information with the only study available,2' and her intuitions appear
consistent with it, at a rather high level of generalization.
In assessing this effort, it is fair to ask, first, whether the method of the
"thought-experiment" is likely to supplant stark utilitarian calculus as a means
to generate or criticize legal rules concerning securities regulation. My own
evaluation is that in no event can it remove utilitarian concerns from our
thinking about securities law.
Consider the equal access rule that the article advances. In the world of
affairs where the consequences of ideas on real people can be sharp and
immediate, a rule-making agency considering the "thought-experiment" would

19. As to the boundedness of human rationality, in fact, see, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof Decisions, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY (Karen S.
Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990); John Elster, When Rationality Fails,in THE LIMrrs OF RATIONALITY
(Karen S. Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990).
20. Scheppele, supra note 1, at n.130 and accompanying text.
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pause on the assertion that all would agree to a rule of equal access, if somehow
we could be polled before we acquired property interests or expectations. That
core assertion is itself, of course, eminently contestable. It is counter-factual and
can be neither proven nor falsified. In the absence of certainty about the core
assertion, it is quite likely that any agency that considers the contractualist
"thought-experiment" methodology would need somehow to assess the likelihood
that unbiased minds would, as the article urges, freely adopt only the equal
access rule. Moreover, because no agency can have perfect information about
hypothetical preferences, one would need to consider as well the likely effects
on the efficiency of securities markets that adoption of such a rule would
occasion. The efficiency costs of the rule, discounted by the risk of incorrectly
concluding that the equal access rule would be the actual (I mean hypothetical)
preference, would be relevant.2 1 If one only has a rough intuition about
preferences, however-which I take to be the case here-the efficiency impacts
of alternative rules would necessarily assume very major importance to a
rulemaker, as a consequence of that uncertainty.
While Professor Scheppele does try to ground her intuitions on risk-taking
in an empirical study, in fact, we will never know with great confidence what the
actual humans who make up this society would, in an unbiased condition, each
prefer in the way of legal rules. Thus, I cannot accept that the contractualist
methodology can ever make utilitarian concerns wholly irrelevant to the process
by which securities disclosure law is formulated. Nor do I believe that this
method can serve its other goal: to decouple "fairness" from the inevitably
contestable and value-laden arguments that seek, in any particular context, to
justify that conclusion.
III
CONCLUSION

The contractualist method seeks to avoid both the stark utilitarianism of neoclassical economics and the messy, contestable nature of "moral reasoning" in
law. It does this by trying to convert the search for fairness into something like
an objective inquiry: What is the rule that in an unbiased state we would all
choose? While this is not really an empirical question, it is one that empirical
social science data would be helpful in answering (for example, what are our
values? What is our psychic attitude towards risk? How do we relate to the
pain of others?). Thus, this method seems to hold out the hope of converting
moral questions into positive questions: The preferred rule is the one we would
all choose in the absence of bias, and we can perform empirical studies to help
us discover how we would choose. In a positivistic age, that alchemy might be

21. I assume, arguendo, that the efficiency costs of the equal access rule, such as they may be, would
be regarded as appropriately incurred where the agency correctly concludes that that rule would be
preferred by all if a referendum could be held behind a partial veil of ignorance.
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expected to exert appeal. But that appeal is false. Empirical inquiries are
unlikely to tell us what our disclosure law should be.'
In attempting to objectify fairness, in order to meet arguments that the
concept is too amorphous to have legitimacy in legal discourse, Professor
Scheppele gives away too much to the critics she would challenge. In the
process, she creates a concept of fairness that strikes me as being too narrow to
have great utility. I suppose there is a better response to those who regard the
concept of fairness as too vague, empty, or meaningless to play a constructive,
legitimate role in legal discourse. That response would deny the validity of the
criticism frontally. It would assert that our law is inherently both a utilitarian
system for facilitating and structuring wealth creating transactions, and a system
of rules of behavior premised on widely shared moral or ethical beliefs.
Evaluation of the fairness of legal rules is an inescapable part of the evaluation
of the quality of the legal system by the citizens who are subjected to that
system. Thus, it cannot be the case that courts, when they are confronted with
the responsibility of interstitial rule formulation or modification, as they
inevitably will be from time to time, may not legitimately take fairness concerns
directly, albeit cautiously, into account.
The perception of the success of our legal system in achieving justice is not
an irrelevant concern. It is central. Periods of social unrest make this clear.
Inquiry into the justice or fairness of the system, or of a rule in the system, is not
meaningless talk in which every statement counts equally. Discussion of the
fairness of a rule takes place at a specific time and place, in a certain culture,
with its history, traditions, and shared beliefs, and in a specific language, with its
shared meanings and history. This social context provides a basis for people to
construct and criticize arguments concerning the fairness of proposed rules.
Furthermore, it provides a basis for others to evaluate the validity of those
claims. This type of discussion will not succeed in finding an objective referent
for concepts of justice or of fairness. But, for those who have come to accept the
inevitability of ambiguity in our social life, the fact that conclusions concerning
fairness will, in principle, be contestable does not justify excluding this important
value from our judicial process. Nor does it, I suppose, necessitate resort to the
innovative technique that this article presents in order to answer claims that the
concept of fairness is empty and constrains courts too little.
Our law has long recognized that fairness concerns can sometimes trump the
claims of clear legal rules. Indeed, that is much of what equity has been all
about for 400 years. Consider, for example, as I recently had occasion to do, the
development of the law of unconscionable contracts.' For well over 200 years,
courts of equity have, in the absence of fraud, refused to enforce or have

22. Empiricism is of great instrumental utility in the law, as a way of informing us how best to
achieve some noncontroversial value. At the risk of stating the obvious, I note, however, that by their
nature, disputes of ultimate value cannot be resolved by empirical investigations.
23. Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377 (Del. Ch. 1992) (holding that shocking and oppressive nature
of transaction required recission).
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rescinded contracts for the sale of land that were formally binding in every
respect but were so oppressive as to "shock the conscience of the court." This
doctrine of unconscionability coexisted with the development of the liberalutilitarian mindset, and continued to exist through the high tide of that mindset
in the neoclassical world of the nineteenth century. It continues to this day and,
indeed, has been expanded by statute in practically every state to reach contracts
for the sale of goods.
The term "unconscionable" is precisely as vague as is the term "fair." The
terms are, of course, conclusions and abstractions. They are not empty vessels
into which any meaning can be poured, however. They are part of our language,
and of our moral and legal traditions. We cannot escape these words with
blurred edges. If our law is to satisfy its basic mission, we must use the concepts
behind them. Their use in our legal system is legitimated by the process of
construction and of argumentation that a court employs in reaching and stating
its conclusions. Our traditions, our political institutions, and the shared
professional understanding of lawyers and judges constrain and delimit the use
that may legitimately be made of these abstractions. I believe, however, that
Professor Scheppele is mistaken in her hope that we can escape the ambiguity
that they entail, the ambiguity that is the special burden of our age, by resort to
the contractualist thought-experiment.
It is difficult not to sympathize with any observer who seeks to remind us
that law is not only a practical institution concerned with welfare, but it is a
reflection of and indeed a constituent part of our moral universe. Some of us
energized by the productive insights generated by economics might, I suppose,
usefully be reminded of that fact from time to time. I am unconvinced, however,
that the contractualist method employed in Professor Scheppele's article can do
more than provide an orientation that allows those who construct and those who
criticize legal rules to identify, imaginatively and sympathetically, with the least
powerful of those affected by legal rules. If it did no more, this reminder would
justify the substantial scholarly effort reflected in Professor Scheppele's fine
article.

